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ABSTRACT: Moran conceives of conscious belief as a conscious activity, rather than awareness of a mental state. 
Once conscious belief is understood in this way, the notion of suppressed belief becomes problematic. In 
this paper, I draw on the work of Merleau-Ponty to sketch an account of suppressed belief. I suggest that 
suppressed beliefs should not be understood as attitudes towards propositions. Instead, they should be 
conceived as ways of perceiving and interacting with the world that are out of keeping with how one repre-
sents it as being. 
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Self-knowledge is a special kind of knowledge each of us can have of her own mental 
states, which is expressed in judgements called avowals. A mental state must be con-
scious for the subject to avow it, thus theories of self-knowledge go hand-in-hand 
with a conception of what it is for a mental state to be conscious. Focusing on avow-
als of belief and intention, Richard Moran (2001) offers an elegant and striking ac-
count of self-knowledge that links it to the subject’s status as a rational agent. His the-
ory conceives of conscious belief and intention as conscious activities of the subject, 
rather than mental states of which the subject is aware —a view that incorporates 
ideas explored by Jean-Paul Sartre. I will suggest that this view makes the usual idea of 
suppressed belief problematic. I will then draw on the work of another phenomenol-
ogical writer —Maurice Merleau-Ponty— to sketch an alternative. 
The traditional model conceives of a conscious belief as a state of which the sub-
ject is conscious. On this picture, the objects of introspective awareness —one’s men-
tal states— exist independently of one’s consciousness of them. The subject believes 
that p whether or not she is conscious of this belief, and her consciousness of it makes 
no difference to her belief. Moran objects to this model because it makes the con-
scious subject a passive spectator of her mental life. Her conscious beliefs are hers in-
sofar as they happen within her, but her relation to them is no different from her rela-
tion to others’ beliefs. He argues in contrast that we need a properly first-personal no-
tion of conscious belief that relates the subject to her conscious beliefs qua subject. 
Moran holds that to be the subject of a conscious belief is to have a certain kind of au-
thority over it: the authority to form and revise it in accordance with one’s reasons. 
This means that to have a conscious belief that p is to consciously endorse p as true. A 
conscious belief’s status as a belief is dependent on the subject’s conscious endorse-
ment of its content at the very moment that it occupies her attention. Moran holds 
that consciously endorsing p cannot be properly captured if it is thought of as a form 
of awareness that has the endorsing of p as its intentional object. He argues instead 
that ‘conscious’ should be understood adverbially as saying something about the qual-
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ity of the endorsing. He compares this to the way in which one may play the piano at-
tentively, unreflectively, or deliberately to annoy someone, where the way in which 
one plays the piano makes a difference to the quality of the playing (Moran 2001: 31). 
Moran’s account of conscious belief is compelling. However, although he discusses 
the implications of unconscious belief for the scope of our self-knowledge, he says 
very little about its nature. There are different kinds of unconscious belief, but 
Moran’s discussion deals specifically with ‘suppressed’ beliefs. These are beliefs the 
subject cannot consciously endorse —and so cannot avow— for Freudian reasons. 
They are attributed to her on the basis of her actions and emotions. If, e.g., I feel re-
sentment when my parents buy my brother a birthday present, try to undermine him 
when we are staying at my parents’ house, but consciously believe that my parents 
love and treat us equally, my psychiatrist might conclude that I have a suppressed be-
lief that my brother is our parents’ favourite child. My suppressed belief is in conflict 
with how I consciously take the world to be and the actions and emotions that flow 
from it are subsequently out of step with my reasons. The goal of therapy in such 
cases is to integrate the subject’s emotions and actions with her conscious view of the 
world, i.e., with her reasons (Moran 2001: 89-93). 
Once conscious belief is understood as consciously endorsing a proposition, the 
notion of suppressed belief becomes problematic. One option is to hold that sup-
pressed belief involves unconsciously endorsing a proposition, where ‘unconsciously’ 
denotes something about the quality of the endorsing. According to this suggestion, 
conscious belief and suppressed belief involve the same activity —proposition-
endorsing— but different ways of engaging in it. However, if we claim that a subject 
endorses a proposition, we must be able to say what this activity consists in, and which 
proposition the subject endorses. Consciously endorsing a proposition consists in entertain-
ing or considering a proposition —having a proposition before one’s mind— and af-
firming or reaffirming that it is true. The proposition the subject consciously endorses 
is the one she entertains —she decides in favour of the proposition that she, at that 
moment, considers. Thus we can see that consciously endorsing a proposition essen-
tially involves entertaining it (although it is more than simply entertaining it, since I 
can entertain a proposition without endorsing it). However, entertaining a proposition 
is a conscious phenomenon. No sense can be given to the claim that the subject enter-
tains a proposition unconsciously. It follows that unconsciously endorsing a proposi-
tion cannot be understood as unconsciously entertaining it and affirming or reaffirm-
ing its truth.  
A common view of suppressed belief —and the subconscious in general— is that 
it involves a division within the mind. A second option, therefore, is to accept that 
propositions can only be endorsed consciously, but claim that in cases of suppressed 
belief, there are two dis-unified centres of consciousness within the same person. On 
this picture, the proposition <my brother is our parents’ favourite child> is con-
sciously endorsed by the other centre of consciousness within me. I cannot avow the 
states that can be attributed to this other centre of consciousness, because I am not re-
lated to them qua subject. My relation to them is analogous to my relation to other 
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people’s mental states. Thus I can only come to know about the other centre’s states 
on the basis of evidence —my behaviour and emotions. One problem with this sug-
gestion is that it cannot explain all types of unconscious belief. During a game of 
football, e.g., I see a member of the opposite team run towards me with the ball. I in-
tercept it and pass it through a gap between two opponents, to someone on my team. 
We explain my action by saying that I believe that I can intercept the ball, and there is a 
gap wide enough to pass the ball through, etc. However, when I perform the action, I 
am fully absorbed in what I am doing; I am not consciously thinking about my ac-
tions. It follows that the beliefs that inform my action, are not conscious beliefs, even 
if —unlike suppressed beliefs— I would consciously endorse them if I were to con-
sider the relevant propositions. The claim that unconscious beliefs are consciously en-
dorsed by another centre of consciousness within me is wholly implausible in cases 
like this one, because it places too great a cognitive demand on the other centre of 
consciousness, which would have to entertain and endorse propositions at an impos-
sible rate, i.e., the speed at which I act. It follows that some other account of uncon-
scious belief is required, and in the absence of some positive reason for taking just 
suppressed beliefs —rather than unconscious beliefs in general— to be consciously 
endorsed by another centre of consciousness, this proposal for understanding sup-
pressed belief should be rejected. 
A third option is to understand suppressed beliefs as components of information-
processing systems. A device such as a computer can be in states that encode informa-
tion, which can then be used to generate output of various kinds, e.g., to perform cal-
culations. The computer’s information states are not conscious, but the computer ‘en-
dorses’ the information as true, insofar as it is used in generating the output. It might 
be supposed that a similar account of suppressed beliefs can be given. My suppressed 
belief that my brother is our parents’ favourite child, e.g., might be thought of as a 
state that encodes this information. The information is then used by some processing 
system that generates my feeling of resentment, and my action of undermining him. 
The proposition <my brother is our parents’ favourite child> is endorsed insofar as 
this information is used in the processing. However, this conception of suppressed 
belief rules out the possibility of therapy. According to Moran, therapy for suppressed 
belief consists in integrating one’s actions and emotions with how one consciously 
takes the world to be, i.e., bringing them into line with one’s reasons. In the case we 
are considering, I consciously believe —in line with my reasons— that our parents 
love and treat my brother and me equally, but I have a suppressed belief that he is the 
favoured child. Freudian considerations prevent my conscious assessment of my rea-
sons from affecting my belief that my brother is the favoured child. I have, in other 
words, no authority over it. The aim of therapy is to restore my authority so that I can 
withdraw endorsement from the proposition <my brother is our parents’ favourite 
child>, since my reasons show that it is false. However, if my suppressed belief is a 
component of an information processing system, therapy could not restore my au-
thority over it, because information-processing systems are the wrong kind of things 
to have this kind of authority over. It follows that suppressed beliefs cannot be under-
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stood as components of information-processing systems, without giving up the possi-
bility of therapy. 
The problem of accounting for suppressed beliefs can be seen as arising from 
three ideas. First, beliefs are propositional attitudes: to have a belief is to endorse a 
proposition. Second, the subject should be conceived as the subject of her mental life, 
not a mere spectator of it. Third, we have some beliefs that we cannot avow. To ac-
commodate the first two ideas, Moran claims that conscious belief involves con-
sciously endorsing a proposition. We have seen that this leads to difficulties in ac-
commodating the third idea —we have some beliefs that we cannot avow. A solution 
is to reject the first idea, and argue that not all beliefs can be analysed as attitudes to 
propositions. This is a claim made by writers in the Phenomenological Tradition. Such 
writers distinguish between the reflective and the pre-reflective levels of being. At the 
reflective level, beliefs are representations of the world, i.e., they have propositional 
content. But at the pre-reflective level, beliefs are non-representational, and simply 
constituted by certain ways of perceiving and acting. Generally speaking, the reflective 
and the pre-reflective levels are integrated and influence each other in various ways so 
that one’s conscious beliefs are in line with one’s actions. However, the pre-reflective 
is not fully transparent to the reflective. It follows that one can have a pre-reflective 
belief that is not in keeping with one’s reflective beliefs, but which will be manifest in 
one’s actions. These ideas allow us to re-conceptualise suppressed beliefs in a way that 
is compatible with Moran’s account of conscious belief as consciously endorsing a 
proposition. Suppressed beliefs conflict with one’s conscious view of the world and 
are attributed to the subject on the basis of her actions and emotions. They can thus 
be identified with pre-reflective beliefs that —for Freudian reasons— are not inte-
grated with the subject’s reflective view of the world. Therapy will aim at integrating 
the two levels of being. Space here prevents me from pursuing this strategy in detail. 
However, I will indicate the shape such an account might take, hopefully showing that 
this strategy is a promising one. 
The clearest and most comprehensive account of pre-reflective being and its rela-
tion to reflective being is perhaps that offered by Merleau-Ponty. He conceives of pre-
reflective being as a bodily form of consciousness. Pre-reflective (non-
representational) beliefs on his account are constituted by the possession and exercise 
of bodily, i.e., physical, abilities, or motor-skills. Two aspects of this claim need to be 
explained: the sense in which the possession and exercise of motor-skills is non-
representational; and how it is that the possession and exercise of such skills can con-
stitute a view of the world. 
Consider first, how motor-skills are acquired. Merleau-Ponty holds that the acqui-
sition of a motor-skill does not involve representations because motor-skills cannot be 
acquired by thinking; there is an irreducibly bodily element to their acquisition. One 
acquires them through practice, which is a process of the body’s familiarising itself 
with the activity in question: to acquire the motor-skill, the body has to “ ‘catch’ the 
movement” (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 143). Consider, e.g., what it is like to learn to play 
the clarinet. One cannot learn to play by thinking about doing so, one has to pick up 
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the instrument and try to play it. At first, the instrument will be experienced as ‘for-
eign’. I may be surprised at its weight, it will smell strange, it may feel uncomfortable 
in my hands, and when I try to play it, I may repeatedly miss the lower keys as I am 
unused to their position. As I practise, I will become familiar with the way the instru-
ment feels, the amount I have to stretch my fingers to reach the keys, how hard to 
blow it to reach the high notes, and so forth. It will no longer feel strange and uncom-
fortable to hold; playing it will be second-nature or habitual to me. 
Motor-skills can also be exercised without the need for representations. There are 
two dimensions to the exercise of a motor-skill. First, motor-skills are exercised in 
perception. On Merleau-Ponty’s account, perception is directly of things and situa-
tions that call for a certain kind of behaviour. He suggests, e.g., that when a player is 
engaged in a game of football, she perceives the yard lines as real boundaries —lines 
of force— not just white lines painted on the ground. Similarly, she perceives her op-
ponents as obstacles, and the spaces between them as opportunities to progress to-
wards goal, or to pass the ball to a member of her team (Merleau-Ponty 1963: 168). In 
some cases, the invitations to behave will constitute an emotive dimension to the 
things and situations one perceives. A dinner party with the Queen, e.g., feels like a 
formal occasion, and it would be inappropriate to behave as I would with my immedi-
ate family. The formality of the occasion calls for a certain sort of behaviour.  
It is the possession of motor-skills that enables the agent to perceive opportunities 
for action. For any physical activity, there will be environments where one can engage 
in it, and environments where one cannot. I cannot roller-skate, e.g., unless I am in a 
bit of the world that contains roller-skates, a relatively flat surface, and a reasonable 
amount of space. Since engaging in an activity essentially requires a certain sort of en-
vironment, the ability to engage in that activity necessarily involves the capacity to 
identify appropriate places to do so. Merleau-Ponty holds that the capacity to identify 
places that are appropriate for engaging in an activity is constituted by the perception 
of those places as inviting one to engage in that activity. Acquiring the ability to do x 
is thus partly a matter of learning to perceive certain places as appropriate for doing x. 
Learning to rock-climb, e.g., partly involves learning to see little cracks and ledges in 
the rock as hand and foot holds. When one starts out, only the bigger ledges and 
wider cracks will look suitable, but as one gets better at rock-climbing, smaller ledges 
will be perceived as offering a passage up the rock-face. Thus one will progress from 
seeing a rock-face as an impassable mass of rock to seeing it as climbable. The better 
one gets at climbing, the better one will become at perceiving opportunities to do so, 
and thus different rock-faces will be perceived as more or less difficult to climb. To 
perceive an opportunity to do x is thus to exercise one’s skill at doing x. 
Clearly, acquiring a motor-skill is not just a matter of learning to perceive opportuni-
ties to do x; it also involves learning to execute the bodily movements involved in do-
ing x. The second way to exercise a motor-skill is by executing the relevant bodily 
movements. Again, Merleau-Ponty holds that the agent can do so without the need 
for representations. The opportunities for action that the agent perceives can immedi-
ately initiate and guide her behaviour without the need for any intervening mental 
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states —such as intentions— that represent the behaviour that is performed. The 
agent simply perceives an opportunity to behave and responds by so behaving. The 
football player, e.g., perceives an opening between two opponents, which ‘invites’ her 
to pass the ball through it. Her perception of the opening as inviting her to pass the 
ball through it, immediately ‘calls forth’ her action of passing the ball. Dreyfus calls 
behaviour that is immediately brought about by one’s perceptions of one’s environ-
ment, ‘absorbed coping’ (Dreyfus 2000). 
Representational thought and absorbed coping interact in various ways. The de-
mands one perceives correspond with the motor-skills one possesses. However, one’s 
current task also contributes to perception. It is only when playing football that the 
player sees the ball as to-be-intercepted. In many cases, the agent’s adoption of a task 
results from her practical deliberations, and in this way representational thought influ-
ences absorbed coping. Representational thought can also build demands into a situa-
tion, over and above those that are simply perceived. When I learn to drive, e.g., I 
have to think about what I am doing, I cannot simply ‘cope’ with my situation like an 
experienced driver. I have to think about what the road signs mean. My judgement 
that a particular road sign means that I should slow down builds an extra demand into 
the situation that I then respond to by slowing down. When I have had enough prac-
tice, I will perceive the sign as requiring me to slow down and do so automatically, 
without needing to think about it. But before I get to this stage, representational 
thought has a hand in guiding my behaviour. There are further ways in which repre-
sentational thought interacts with absorbed coping. 
On Merleau-Ponty’s account, both the possession and the exercise of motor-skills 
constitute pre-reflective beliefs about the world. Motor-skills are general beliefs, whilst 
their exercise in perception and action are specific beliefs about particular things and 
places. Consider, e.g., the ability to type accurately by touch. If I have this ability, I can 
be said to know the position of the letters on the keyboard. On Merleau-Ponty’s ac-
count, this knowledge is not constituted by a representation of the position of the let-
ters, but simply by my capacity to type, i.e., by my possession of the motor-skill. My 
knowledge is a special kind of bodily knowledge, which is distinct from my knowledge 
that, e.g., the capital of England is London. Since I know the position of the letters on 
the keyboard, I can be said to have a belief concerning their position, but this belief is 
not a representational state, it is constituted by my ability to type. Possession of this 
motor-skill is not tied to any particular keyboard (I can type by touch on lots of differ-
ent keyboards), and thus the belief it constitutes is about the positioning of letters on 
keyboards in general. Now consider a case where I perceive a rock-face as climbable, 
and respond to this perception by climbing it. The object of my perception is the par-
ticular thing in front of me, the rock-face. My action of climbing also concerns this 
particular object —it is with this particular object that I engage. The way that I ‘cope’ 
with, the rock-face constitutes a pre-reflective belief that the particular thing in front 
of me is suitable for climbing. 
On the whole, one ‘copes’ with the world in ways that are congruous with how one 
represents it as being. But this is not always so. A person may consciously endorse the 
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proposition <I am only attracted to members of the opposite sex>, whilst perceiving 
people of the same sex as attractive, and immediately responding to this perception by 
behaving flirtatiously towards them. Her perceptions and behaviour constitute a bod-
ily belief that people of the same sex are attractive, which is in conflict with her repre-
sentational belief that she is only attracted to people of the opposite sex. Where a sub-
ject has a bodily belief that is in conflict with those propositions that she would con-
sciously endorse, she can be attributed with a suppressed belief. It was claimed above 
that I have a suppressed belief that my brother is our parents’ favourite child. This can 
be understood as a bodily belief, constituted by certain habitual ways of perceiving my 
brother and acting towards —or interacting with— him. The emotive dimension to 
my perceptions of my brother, e.g., is one of jealousy and resentment. Just as the 
sense of formality immediately regulates my behaviour at the dinner party with the 
Queen, so too my feelings of jealousy and resentment immediately call forth certain 
sorts of behaviour from me. When we are at our parents’ house, I will perceive and 
respond to opportunities to undermine my brother, and so on.  
The goal of therapy will be to integrate the two levels of belief, so that my ways of 
‘coping’ with my brother are brought into alignment with my conscious beliefs about 
our parents’ opinions of us. A full account of how therapy operates on this picture is 
beyond the scope of this paper. However, I will briefly indicate what it involves. One’s 
pre-reflective beliefs are one’s habitual ways of ‘coping’ with the world. Where these 
beliefs are suppressed, they are out of keeping with the way one represents the world 
as being. In the case discussed above, my reasons support my conscious belief that my 
brother and I are loved and treated equally by our parents, but I have a pre-reflective 
belief that he is the favoured child, which is constituted by certain habitual ways of 
‘coping’ with him. To bring the two into alignment, I need to break my habitual ways 
of ‘coping’ with my brother and form new habits. My therapist will help me uncover 
the source of my old habits, and bring me to the realization that these ways of ‘coping’ 
with my brother are ungrounded, thus paving the way for a new habit to be formed. 
Acquiring new ways of coping with my brother will be similar to acquiring a motor-
skill such as driving a car. To begin with, I will not simply perceive situations involv-
ing my brother as requiring a certain kind of behaviour. Instead, I will have to repre-
sent the demands to which I respond. Over time, however, these new demands will 
simply be perceived. Once this happens, my pre-reflective beliefs about my brother —
my habitual ways of ‘coping’ with him— will be in alignment with how I represent the 
world as being. 
The above account of suppressed beliefs as ways of coping with the world that are 
out of keeping with how one consciously takes it to be, allows us to both retain 
Moran’s view of conscious belief as consciously endorsing a proposition, and accom-
modate the thought that we are not completely transparent to ourselves. It also high-
lights the limitations of our self-knowledge. It is our conscious beliefs that we can 
avow. Thus self-knowledge concerns reflective being. Most of the time, one’s con-
scious beliefs are in line with one’s pre-reflective view of the world, as the two levels 
are integrated in various ways. Nevertheless, the reflective and pre-reflective levels of 
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being are distinct, and there can be varying degrees of dis-integration between them. 
Insofar as this dis-integration is possible, our self-knowledge is never complete. There 
is no absolute guarantee that my ways of coping with the world will accord with my 
representations of it. 
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